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Uniformity and Efficiency in the Uniform
Commercial Code: A Partial Research Agenda
By F. Stephen Knippenberg*and William J. Woodward, Jr.**

Why is the Uniform Commercial Code ("U.C.C." or "Code") so "nonuniform?" Might the Code be better understood and characterized as a patchwork of unorthodox local variations rather than a "uniform" statute? Are
matters getting better or worse? And does it matter?
These questions have come up perennially since the beginning of the Uniform
Commercial Code project in 1940, and the recurrence of these questions surely
signals our perceived lack of success in dealing with lack of uniformity within
the Code. The persistent nature of the problem could suggest either that the
affected interests lack the will to solve the problem or that the problem defies
solution.
The Subcommittee on Relation of the U.C.C. to Other Law began as a
project to consider the impact of "other law" on the desirably smooth operation
of the U.C.C. Its recent assumption to Subcommittee status suggests that the
problem is important enough to think about in an organized way. As such, the
Subcommittee is charged with looking at those aspects of "other law" that
impede the smooth, efficient operation of the U.C.C. as a statute designed to
address commercial law matters on a national scale.
The most obvious type of "other law" that might impede a smoothly functioning U.C.C. is the nonuniform state amendment, that is, the statute that
replaces the orthodox U.C.C. provision with a local one.' We are all familiar
with nonuniform amendments of all types-from the kind that serves the needs
*Mr. Knippenberg is a member of the Texas bar and an associate professor of law at the University
of Toledo.
*Mr. Woodward is a member of the Pennsylvania bar and a professor of law at Temple
University. He is the Chair of the Subcommittee on Relation of the Uniform Commercial Code
Committee to Other Law. The authors thank Caryl Carlson and Patricia A. Seddon for their
research assistance.
1. William A. Schnader reported some 775 amendments to the U.C.C. as of 1967, Schnader, A
Short History of the Preparationand Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. Miami L.
Rev. 1, 10 (1967). The Permanent Editorial Board noted 337 nonuniform amendments to article 9
alone. Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code Rep. ("P.E.B. Report") 3
(1967). The tendency for state legislatures to amend the proposed drafts seems to have led, in large
part, to the creation of the Board, see P.E.B. Report 1, XXVII, and motivated it later to adopt the
1972 Amendments, P.E.B. Report 3 (1967). See also Schnader, The Uniform Commercial CodeToday and Tomorrow, 22 Bus. Law. 229 (1966).

2519

2520

The Business Lawyer; Vol. 45, August 1990

of identifiable political constituencies2 to the amendments that improve on the
orthodox. What do- these many amendments suggest about "uniformity" and
about the uniform law approach to commercial law?

Code "uniformity" is a matter worth considering on two grounds: first, a
principal end of the Code project was to bring national uniformity to the
commercial law; 4 second, the project arguably has failed in that particular.
Whether and to what extent the U.C.C. has failed in its promise of uniformity;
whether that failure is inevitable or can be reversed; and whether such a failure
is worth reversing, are questions the Subcommittee has been considering.
It is undeniable that the Code has not brought a literal uniformity to the law
of commercial transactions.' Not all states even have the same version of the

U.C.C., and nonuniform amendment of Code provisions occurs so commonly
that individual instances scarcely capture our attention.7 We could, of course,

guarantee textual uniformity by enacting the U.C.C. at the federal level-a
notion that the drafters considered and that emerges from time to time-but this
approach has received only vacillating support.' Since there is no apparent
2. An example of this kind might be the nonuniform amendments which eliminate the farm
products exception from U.C.C. § 9-307(1). The amended version subordinates the pre-existing
secured lender to the "ordinary course" buyer of encumbered farm products; the orthodox rule calls
for the opposite priority. Examples of the nonuniform approach include California, Kansas
(partial), Minnesota, and Tennessee. The Federal Food Security Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 1631-1632
(West 1988), has replicated the dissenters' policy choice. See Clark, U.C.C. Survey of Secured
Transactions, 42 Bus. Law. 1333, 1334-40 (1987).
3. California's proposed amendments to U.C.C. §§ 9-501(3), 9-502(2), and 9-504(2) make more
clear the implications of a secured party's failure to sell the collateral in compliance with part 5 of
article 9. These amendments may well clarify confused prior law and thereby effect improved
predictability in this area.
4. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c) provides that an underlying purpose of the U.C.C. is "to make uniform
the law among the various jurisdictions." See also Handbook of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and Proceedings 58 (1940).
For an extensive listing of the legal literature on the history of the Code, see Mooney,
Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Some Observations on the Past,
Present, and Future of the U.C.C., 41 Bus. Law. 1343, 1344 n.4 (1986). Mooney also provides a
brief drafting history of the Code. Id. at 1344-47.
5. Mooney tells us "[Tlhe U.C.C. is not 'uniform' and, no doubt, never will be. The late S and
early S may have represented the high point of uniformity." Mooney, supra note 4, at 1346.
6. Professor Taylor states that although the U.C.C. has been unanimously adopted in every state
but Louisiana, local amendments and judicial interpretations have resulted in "likeness rather than
exactness." Taylor, Recent Developments in Commercial Law, Forward: Federalismor Uniformity
of Commercial Law, 11 Rut-Cam. L.J. 527, 531 (1980) ("Recent Developments in Commercial
Law").
7. Perhaps, as Mooney suggests, " ... such tinkering by the legislatures might have been
expected in such a broad and important codification." Mooney, supra note 4, at 1347.
8. Justice Robert Braucher and William A. Schnader were early advocates of a federal U.C.C.
to be enacted by Congress coincident with state enactment. See Braucher, Federal Enactment of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Probs. 100 (1951); Schnader, The Uniform
Commercial Code-Today and Tomorrow, 22 Bus. Law. 229, 231 (1966). In Federalism and the
Uniform Commercial Code, Professor Kennedy briefly discusses the positions of Braucher and
Schnader on this score. Professor Kennedy likewise quotes Ray D. Henson to the effect that
"[flederal enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code will become a necessity if various states
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ground swell of support for a federal U.C.C., textual uniformity may continue

to be elusive.9
Does the lack of literal uniformity (in the sense of textual identity) amount to
a significant failure of the U.C.C. project? Surely it is appropriate, 50 years
after the U.C.C.'s beginnings, to raise again some basic questions about uniformity in the commercial law context. What do we mean by it? How important is
it and why? Is it attainable? Grappling with these questions has convinced
members of the Subcommittee that there are no easy answers and that research
would contribute to the validity of our answers to many of the issues. We now
pose some of these questions to encourage discussion and also suggest how much
we ought to find out to continue the improvement the Code has brought to

commercial law.

UNDERLYING PREMISES
Apart from economy in drafting, uniformity in the law of commercial
transactions has nothing to recommend it as an end in itself. Uniformity is a
thing of real value only to the extent it advances other Code goals and purposes.
These rest upon readily identifiable, and generally agreed-upon, major premises
of commercial law. To decide what we mean or should mean by uniformity in

the commercial law, we begin by recalling these premises and goals.
While there is no end of ways to order the premises underlying commercial
law, central in the array must be the objective that commercial law should make
doing business easier for business people.' ° To put the matter more precisely,
commercial law should not get in the way of wealth-making through voluntary
exchange transactions." Any rule of, or appeal to, commercial law that fails in
this may be antithetical to the fundamental premise and should be justified on
some special and compelling grounds. Uniformity, one assumes, advances this
persist in adopting peculiar local variations." Kennedy, Federalism and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 29 Bus. Law. 1225, 1226 (1974).
A federal version of the Code was, in fact, under consideration in 1951. The draft was criticized,
however, on a number of planes by prominent legal scholars, among them Justice Braucher,
otherwise a proponent of a federal Code. Id. at 1230. One significant weakness in the draft was its
failure to include article 6 on Bulk Sales and article 9 on Secured Transactions. Id. at 1227. See also
Taylor, supra note 6, at 529-30, 546-50; Taylor, Uniformity of Commercial Law and State-by-State
Enactment: A Confluence of Contradictions,30 Hastings L.J. 337, 361-63 (1978) ("Uniformity of
Commercial Law").
9. Historically, uniform acts adopted by all, or a majority of, states have faced the same lack of
success in remaining uniform. While the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act, and the Uniform Stock Transfer Act were adopted by all states and the
Uniform Sales Act was adopted by 34 states, all faced similar inability to attain uniformity because
of local amendments and interpretational differences. See Taylor, Recent Developments in Commercial Law, supra note 6, at 529-30.
10. See Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and the Merchant Rules, 100 Harv. L.
Rev. 465, 494 (1986).
11. Cf.Taylor, Recent Developments in Commercial Law, supra note 6, at 552-53 where the
author suggests that a federal Code would benefit business interests with better overall prosperity
and risk allocation.
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goal by making the law more accessible and less confusing and thereby reduces
the transaction costs of contracting.
One might identify at least three subsidiary policies or goals of commercial
law calculated to promote the central premise. Thus, we facilitate voluntary
exchange transactions where the law: (i) tends to follow business practice rather
than prescribing it; 2 (ii) encourages and embraces emerging forms that follow
from the natural evolution of business practices;" and (iii) is predictable, such
that commercial endeavors may be undertaken with confidence." With these
policies in focus, we can turn our attention to some implications of the uniformity goal.

BUSINESS PRACTICE AND DIVERSITY
It is a simple matter to decree that commercial law, specifically, the Code,
will follow business practices, and that a single, rational set of uniform rules
memorializing such practices should be decided upon and articulated. Indeed,
the Code as drafted, in some measure at least, sought to do as much. 5 Carrying
out such a program is, however, a different matter. The fact is that no formal
mechanism exists to discover what business people actually do for purposes of
drafting rules to embrace that practice." Our familiarity with business practice
more likely comes filtered through the eyes of lawyers, and is incorporated into
the drafting process anecdotally and sporadically. Beyond that, the notion that
any but the simplest, most routinized transactions are conducted identically in,
for instance, Sacramento and Atlanta, seems counter-intuitive. Of course, interstate and international commercial transactions doubtless follow certain general
patterns of practice, and perhaps a set of practices might be identified upon
which may be constructed an ideal transaction and uniform rule. 7 At the
12. Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 Yale L.J. 1341 (1948). Of

course, the law also has an important role to play in how business develops by, for example,
channeling business behavior in certain directions. Commercial law history is, however, riddled with
situations (such as the persistence of nonpossessory security interests in personal property) in which
business interests doggedly sought to avoid legal constraint and eventually prevailed. This history
makes us skeptical of the law's ability to force business people to do things its way.
13. Taylor, Recent Developments in Commercial Law, supra note 6, at 548.
14. Id., at 552-53; Taylor, Uniformity of Commercial law, supra note 8, at 367-68.

15. Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 Tenn. L. Rev. 779 (1953); Llewellyn, Problems of
Codifying Security Law, 13 Law & Contemp. Probs. 687 (1948). Professor Wiseman says that
Llewellyn believed that "commercial realities, rather than general abstract concepts, should form
the basis for the law." Wiseman, supra note 10, at 494. Compare U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(b) which states
that an underlying policy is "to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties."
16. The drafting process attempts to include persons with diverse experience and interests and
seeks the views of interest groups prior to enactment. Most recently, the process of drafting article
4A included nonlawyer business people in the drafting and sought their comments throughout the
process. Nonetheless, while there are signs of improvement, the process seems inevitably anecdotal
and ad hoc. Cf Mooney, supra note 4, at 1355.
17. Presumably, as Professor Kennedy observes, where the law is uniform among the states,
local and national interests would be mainly in accord. Kennedy, supra note 8, at 1229.
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national level, a practice-based set of uniform rules could arguably constitute
the fulfillment of the first goal we described for the commercial law.
Yet national uniform rules of commercial law, however derived, may present
us with a paradox. To the extent local business practices deviate from the ideal
transaction upon which rest the uniform rules, the law no longer follows
business, but prescribes it in a form that is at variance with the local business
practice."8 Under these circumstances, to follow business at the national level is
to depart from it at the local level. 19 To the extent local interests wish commercial law to reflect their way of doing things, tension can arise from the
2°
imposition of a national uniform set of rules derived from the ideal transaction.
Once one recognizes this paradox of the uniform commercial law movement,
one is struck by the void of hard data on the nature of American business
practice for lawmaking purposes. For example, do we have more interstate
business than local? How much variance is there from state to state or area to
area in business practice? To the extent business practice turned out to be
largely interstate, one might argue that uniform rules would be worth the costs
of necessarily deviating from local practice. On the other hand, if most relevant
transactions are local, the data might support a quiltwork Code that can be
tailored to fit various local interests.'
Yet permitting (or encouraging) local variations might not move us closer to
the goal of allowing the law to be flexible enough to follow business practice.
This is because the Code, as a state statute, necessarily proceeds along political
(state) boundaries. Business practices may change with state boundaries, on the
other hand, only coincidentally. For instance, data might well support one's
intuition that business practices in Philadelphia are more like those of Camden,
New Jersey than like those in Altoona, Pennsylvania. Thus, state law variations
in the Code designed to fit local practices may, in fact, relate only coincidentally
to such practices in other locales within the state.
The point is that without data with which to approach these questions of
local business practices, it seems foolhardy to predict confidently that either

national uniformity or state diversity will better ensure that the law reflects,
rather than dictates, commercial behavior.
We currently have a state law approach to the U.C.C. that permits a
blending of national and local interests in a working example of the federal
system. Although the goal has been textual uniformity, our approach allows
state-by-state development of commercial law and grudgingly permits local

experimentation in the form of nonuniform amendment and local judicial
18. Again, we really have no systematic way to make this determination except to the extent that
local amendments tend to memorialize a local practice or viewpoint.
19. But see Taylor, Recent Developments in Commercial Law, supra note 6, at 550-51

suggesting that "Iviery few states have any important commercial law interest that is not shared by
other states."
20. But cf Taylor, Recent Developments in Commercial Law, supra note 6, at 551-52.

21. To some extent, the tension implicit in a nonuniform approach may be relieved by
thoughtfully drafted choice-of-law provisions. See Mooney, supra note 4, at 1357 for an illustration
of this point in the context of multi-state transactions within article 6 on Bulk Sales.
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interpretation. Without data, it remains to be seen whether our current approach has.helped reconcile the tensions that might exist between local and
national (and international) practices, or whether the approach is simply
oblivious to it.

BUSINESS PRACTICE AND CHANGE
Flexibility in the law to permit, even encourage, emerging transaction fornis
is related to the notion that the law should not unnecessarily constrain business.
The evolution of ne, transaction forms requires some measure of flexibility in
the law. 2 Where te applicable rules-the Code-fail to acknowledge and
embrace emerging business practice, the rules, not the new practice, will
eventually wither. If newly-emerged transactions are economically valuable,
that is to say, if they make doing business easier for business people, they will
survive and prosper and eventually force change in the law.23 From its onset,
maintaining adaptability-preventing textual obsolescence-has been a central
focus in the Code drafting effort.24 The Code preserved flexibility in most of Its
text through a broad general drafting style that allocated more discretion to the
courts to develop specific rules than business people might have liked.25

22. It may not be much of an understatement to suggest that the Code was built on this
proposition. U.C.C. § 1-102 Comment I provides in part that "this Act is drawn to provide
flexibility so that, since it is intended to be a semi-permanent piece of legislation, it will provide its
own machinery for expansion of commercial practices."
23. Where, for instance, forms of collateral appear in the marketplace against which lenders
agree to extend credit, absent compelling policies to the contrary, article 9 must be there to embrace
them. See generally Knippenberg, Tacit Exclusion: Defining Code Terms Using Extraneous

Referents, 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 1261 (1988). For historic examples of this process of commercial law
change, see Bane, From Ifolt and Mansfield to Story to Llewellyn and Mentschikoff" The Progressive Development of Commercial Law, 37 U. Miami L. Rev. 351 (1983) and Gilmore, On Statutory

Obsolescence,,39 U. Colo. L. Rev. 461, 465-71 (1967) discussing the development of the Negotiable
Instruments Law and the Uniform Sales Act.
24. See Bane, supra note 23; Gilmore, supra note 12.
25. Professor Gilmore put it this way:
"By preference, perhaps for jurisprudential reasons, law professors, whether they are working
on Restatement or Code, draft in a style of loose and vague generality; they are not much
concerned with providing specific answers to specific questions; they are concerned with the
erection of a conceptual framework which will at most, when a specific question is posed, serve
as a guide to the range of possible answers. Practical men seem to have become aware of the
Code and to have decided that they should do something about it only toward the end of the
1940's. A practitioner's instinctive preference, in drafting style, is at the opposite pole from the
preference I have attributed to my own breed. He quite naturally wants the statute to answer,
clearly and unequivocally, the questions which he wants to put. So far as the Code was
concerned, the practitioners came too late to have much effect on those parts which, like the
Sales Article, had been finished and, so to say, put on the shelf."
Gilmore, supra note 23, at 473.
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The result often has been adaptability through judicial decision.26 What
impact would moving to a strictly uniform text have on adaptability? How, for
example, would a federally enacted U.C.C. operate if states lacked the power to
tailor it to local needs?
If a centrally-enacted law were to retain the ability to adapt to developing
regional business practices, a single uniform text, free of the confusion of the
state nonuniform amending process, would likely be very general and allocate
significant responsibility for developing more specific rules to the courts. 2' There
is no reason to think that such an approach with its explicit expansion of
judicial power would be more politically palatable today than it was before. On
the other hand, a single uniform text that tended to state hard-edged, predictable rules would quickly become out of date both regionally and nationally.
Such specificity contrasts with the core idea of the current Code as a commercial
constitution whose fundamental tenets and underlying principles have something to offer under changing and changed business conditions. 28 The drafters'
challenge continues to be that of developing a single, nationally uniform text
that is flexible enough to adapt to changes occurring not only on a grand scale
(broad shifts in behavior that occur nationally or internationally) but also to
those changes which evolve in a piecemeal fashion, or on a jurisdiction-byjurisdiction basis.
In theory, at least, it certainly seems that a single yet flexible Code is possible.
Yet the many nonuniform amendments added to the current Code by legislatures already may signal that the drafters achieved something less than the
ideal. The problem with a broad and general text that would allow for local
variation in practice and the evolution of new transaction forms over time is that
such a text seems to compromise predictability, a goal for commercial law that is
itself a powerful incentive for voluntary exchange transactions."

26. The chief instrumentality of adaptation according to the drafters is the courts. See U.C.C.
§ 1-102, Comment 1. It has been suggested that strict judicial adherence to a congressionally enacted
national text would achieve uniformity at too great a cost in terms of adaptability. See Kennedy,
supra note 8, at 1234.
27. One alternative to adaptability through generality is having a legislative amendment process
that could keep pace with developing business practice. This seems unlikely: our experience at the
federal and state levels has been to the contrary. Cf Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence:
The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 Vt. L. Rev. 203 (1979).
28. See Gilmore, supra note 23.
29. The rigidity and specificity in article 9 of which Professor Gilmore complains, see G.
Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 85 (1977) was, according to Professor Kripke "not so much a
desire to compel decision as a need to be able to predict decision .. " Kripke, Some Reflections
After a Quarter-Century of the Uniform Commercial Code ard on the Inception of a New
Bankruptcy Code, 87 Com. L.J. 124, 124 (1982). That need "impelled [practicing lawyers] to
demand that answers to real-life problems be found in the Code and suit the needs of lawyers and
their clients, not leave matters to the sort of speculation out of which law school socratic dialogues
are made." Id.
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The current Code is somewhat less open-textured" and appears to accommodate local practice partly through judicial gap-filling and partly through the
nonuniform amendment process. Instead of being a practice to be condemned,
this state amendment process might be viewed as being in the best federal
tradition and could in fact be the best way to allow local variation" while
advancing predictability. One's view on the matter probably depends in part on
the nature of the nonuniform amendments legislated into the Code and the
extent to which they advance the more general objectives of commercial law.
It is possible, for example, that many nonuniform amendments are driven by
a demand for "certainty" and that, as enacted, they eliminate the flexibility that
was built into a provision in its orthodox form. 2 Consider, for example, U.C.C.
section 9-504(3) providing, in part, that all aspects of a sale of repossessed
collateral must be commercially reasonable. Let us assume that based upon
peculiarly local business considerations, a legislature amends the Code to state
that a sale that does not occur within 30 days of repossession is not commercially
reasonable. The result is a nonuniform amendment imposing a fixed 30-day
period within which the collateral must be sold. Should the commercial conditions that rendered sales past 30 days from repossession commercially unreasonable disappear, the amending jurisdiction must modify its provision, or the
provision in its original amended form (30 days) will fail again to reflect and fit
local commercial preferences. 3 State legislatures have not shown great success
in keeping their statutes current.
30. Cf Rubin, Uniformity, Regulation, and Federalizationof State Law: Some Lessons from the

Payment System, 49 Ohio St. L.J. 1251, 1262 (1989) states that:
tIthe U.C.C. adopts the useful strategy of stating its rules on two levels: a formal rule that is
intended to have binding force and a more chatty commentary that serves as an interpretive
guide. This indicates a fair degree of sophistication, but it has not eliminated the variability of
interpretation. Reality has a way of presenting problems that the rule-maker did not and often
could not have anticipated, while words have an annoying tendency to liquefy and flow under
the pressure of events.
31. But see supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
32. A report from California's U.C.C. Committee, for example, states:
[clommercial reasonableness is not defined in the Commercial Code. The drafters of the
Commercial Code declined to define that concept, in order to allow flexibility in dealing with
each distinct situation and the peculiarities of particular collateral. All too often, however, such
flexibility has become a trap for the secured party. Without structured guidelines, the secured
party acts subject to review on a "hindsight" basis.
Report of the Uniform Commercial Code Committee of the State Bar of California on Proposed
Amendment to California Uniform Commercial Code Sections 9501(3), 9502(2) and 9504(2) at 1-2.

33. As originally enacted, the nonspecific commercially reasonable standard would automatically
accommodate the new circumstances through judicial decisions, since the standard follows commercial practices.
One author has suggested an alternative to generally-drafted provisions that might yield adaptability over time. The proposal was that legislatures provide that their laws lose their statutory force
after 20 years and that the statutory subject matter at that point be given to the courts for further
development with the guidance of the statute but without its binding force. See Davies, supra note
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Moreover, such a local amendment that met local business demands for a
predictable rule may not agree with perceptions in other jurisdictions of the
specifics of commercial reasonableness in this context. If that is the case, the
freedom to amend and the resulting lack of uniformity will produce tension
between distinctly local and interstate transactions, and particular confusion
when there is doubt about whose law applies to the transaction. In short, there
simply is no guarantee that the federal experiment, expressed as the freedom of
states to make nonuniform amendments to the Code, advances the law's adaptability to local and evolutionary business practice; research may show that it
retards it.

We thus might well consider the nature of the nonuniform amendments to
date to see what they can teach us about the Code we have and the Code we
should have. Are nonuniform amendments typically specific corrections in
frustrated reaction to vagueness or flexibility? If the number of specific corrections by nonuniform amending of flexible Code provisions is significant, we
might, for example, conclude that the parties engaged in Code-governed transactions are disenchanted with a generalized, though adaptable and flexible,
approach to commercial law. If business demands specificity, should we have a
different sort of Code, one with many fixed standards to foster predictability? Is
it possible for a Code of this kind to survive long in a shifting commercial
market? Or could we build with it an administrative or other apparatus
4
designed to discover new business practices and legislate based on them? 3 It
remains to be seen, of course, whether it is possible to quantify data concerning
nonuniform amendments and organize it around these inquiries in a meaningful
way.
If we are concerned about uniformity, an inquiry solely into the Code texts
may be too narrow. Even where texts are uniform, might courts view provisions
parochially?35 Of course, the more flexible and open-textured a provision, the
27. In the commercial area, one suspects that the obsolescence of hard-edged rules will occur much
more rapidly.
34. A third possibility would be to permit-even encourage-states to insert nonuniform,
specific, predictable rules and focus attention at the national level on predictable conflicts of law
rules rather than uniformity. Predictability of result might, on balance, be better under this
approach than under a relatively more open-textured law that was uniform across states. This
approach would, however, lack adaptability unless it were combined with sleek amendment
processes at the state level to keep the specific rules in touch with contemporary business practices.
35. What courts do with the Code is a matter that has received considerable scholarly attention,
not all of it in agreement. Writing in 1974, Professor Kennedy told us:
"The perverseness of judges has often been thought to be more of an obstacle than the
resistance of legislators to any effort to attain uniformity of the laws among American
jurisdictions. Judge Friendly speaks of the difficulties of getting legislatures to cooperate by
adopting uniform laws and adopting them uniformly but refers to 'the sheer impossibility of
getting unruly judges to interpret them uniformly.' The performance of the courts in construing the Uniform Commercial Code seems, however, to have provoked only one published
protest that characterizes the disparate judicial construction of the Code of sufficient seriousness to warrant federal enactment. A survey was made in 1969 of approximately one thousand
Code decisions and there were thirteen issues on which inconsistent answers had been given.
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greater the opportunity for judicial localizing of the uniform text. This poses
interesting political questions about the allegiance of the judiciary. The Code
itself states the interpretive goals in section 1-102: (a) to simplify, clarify, and
modernize the law governing commercial transactions; (b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of
the parties; and (c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions."
The question remains whether the courts in fact follow these mandates or
whether they solve problems with a more parochial approach. 7 Like the
questions posed earlier concerning the nature of nonuniform amendments, the
question whether state courts can or do interpret the U.C.C.-a state statutein a nonparochial way is worth examining for what it might reveal about our
current Code and for what we might reasonably expect of our ongoing or future
codification efforts.

THE PROCESS OF ADDRESSING COMMERCIAL LAW
VARIANCE
There may be a way to strike an acceptable balance between flexibility and
predictability, and between the interests of parochial and national commerce as
well; the expectations we have for uniformity and the processes by which we
seek to achieve it could have a role in striking that balance. The process our
system currently employs in addressing local variation is most important in
developing an optimal balance of uniformity that accommodates flexibility and
predictability. We might consider, for example, what the Permanent Editorial
Board, local or national bar groups, or others do about especially insightful and
well-drafted nonuniform amendments which arguably improve upon the uni38
form law.
Some regard California's unorthodox version of U.C.C. article 2A, for
example, as enlightened and some consider that state's amendments to article 9
to be insightful as well. That state's process included a long lead-time in
considering the official drafts proposed for adoption, and the amendments
Not only are the conflicts charted unimpressive in quantity, but none appears to rise to a

sufficient significance to be a cause for national concern."
Kennedy, supra note 8, at 1228 (footnotes omitted). At page 1233, Professor Kennedy continued,
"ITlhe country is deriving the benefits that inhere in some of the features of the Code that are
productive of divergence injudicial construction, including the use of general concepts like 'unconscionability' and 'commercial reasonableness'...."
By way of contrast, Mooney, writing in 1986, stated: "More nonuniformity among states and
more 'bad' commercial law result from inconsistent and poorly reasoned judicial interpretations
than from deficiencies in the U.C.C. text and unwise or poorly conceived statutory and regulatory
intervention." Mooney, supra note 4, at 1352-53.
36. U.C.C. § 1-102(2).
37. An older treatment of this issue is Note, Disparate judicial Construction of the Uniform
Commercial Code-The Needfor Federal Legislation, 1969 Utah L. Rev. 722.
38. Study might show that very few nonuniform amendments are sufficiently well-drafted and
integrated into the Code to be considered "enlightened." Such a discovery might undercut some of

the justifications we might otherwise have for permitting state-to-state variation in the Code text.
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themselves were developed by a high-level state U.C.C. committee. Surely,
super-amendments can be a positive aspect of the federal system of Code law
that argue powerfully for the "federal experiment." Where states are willing to
devote sufficient resources to improving the law, the official uniform drafting
process may thereby become informed.39 The state experiment and effort can
thereby become a part of the uniform drafting process, rather than an act of
departure from it. The problem is, however, that even nonuniform amendments
that are the product of the most stalwart efforts and driven by substantial
resources may not be-or be acknowledged to be-improvements on the national text.
A well-drafted, nonuniform amendment may amount to a true improvement
only at the local level by facilitating or validating local commercial practices. In
this sense, local interests might well decide all local amendments to be superior
to the orthodox text however inappropriate they might be for commercial
activity at the interstate or international level.4" But even an amendment's
"true" improvement over the national text does not ensure its prompt incorporation into the official text or its adoption by other enlightened states. The pace
of the Code revision process and interim demands for uniformity will typically
prevent even an enlightened amendment from improving the law between major
national drafting efforts. If a legislature believes its process has yielded an
improvement, can it justifiably await incorporation into the Official Text?
Should the state lobby for the change at the national level to encourage
uniformity? Should it encourage other states to follow its lead and thereby
create pressure for national reform? A major justification for permitting stateto-state diversity is that experimentation and legal innovation at the state level
can yield overall improvement in the law better than would a single system that
precluded state diversity.4" If this serves as a justification for the U.C.C. as a
state statute, perhaps we can do much better than we now do in using the state
experience to improve the law.42

39. The state-level processes may, however, be subject to greater political pressures and different
proportionate representation than those at the national level. Did, for example, the California
committee that worked on article 2A reflect all relevant interests or was there a disproportionate
share of lessor-secured party (or lessee-debtor) interests on the committee? Are particular interest
groups more likely to have influence at the state than at the national level? If state amendments are
the product of narrow political pressure-if nationally powerful interests are left out of the local
process-the result will be "corrective" legislation at the national level which will increase
complexity and the costs of doing business.
40. Mooney suggests an "Environmental Impact Report" submitted for consideration by the
National Conference before the legislative enactment of a nonuniform amendment. Mooney, supra
note 4, at 1356.
41. See Taylor, Uniformity of Commercial Law, supra note 8, at 362.

42. Discussing congressional adoption of the Food Security Act which reverses article 9's farm
products exception, see supra note 2, in which Professor Clark noted: "[ulnfortunately, the
Permanent Editorial Board of the U.C.C. did nothing about the farm products problem. It failed to
suggest any changes in section 9-307(1) that would stem the tide of litigation and nonuniform state
modifications.... In light of this confusion,.., it is not surprising that buyer groups turned to
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Much might be learned from a broad look at the state-by-state amending and
enacting process itself.4 3 This is a matter distinct from the issue of whether the
amendments that flow from the process are tolerable or not from the national
perspective. We might wish to know, for instance, whether some states follow
others in formulating nonuniform amendments. We might also wish to learn
something of the nature of the demands of the people who are often behind state
amendments. Such information about the amending and enacting processes may
allow us to respond with meaningful conclusions to such questions as to whether
we can ever expect local interests to embrace a policy of national uniformity
over local improvements worked by nonuniform amendments. We might conclude from this that some aspects of uniformity should bend to other goals.
At a broader level, further study might inform us about the kind of uniformity in commercial law that is best to seek. When we call for a uniform Code,
should we mean a single, highly specific, nationally identical text? If so, to what
extent, if any, should we tolerate nonuniform amendments to the national draft
to allow for tailoring of the law to local diversity and to the evolution in business
practices over time? And to what extent are we willing with such a Code to
expedite and streamline the national amendment process so that the law keeps
in reasonable touch with business development?" Alternatively, should we
prefer a very open-textured Code that is variable by the judiciary to accommodate local interests and changing conditions and preferences, that would require
few amendments, but which would cost much in predictability at all levels? If
we opt for this kind of Code, what impact will the perceived inability to predict
results have on commercial activity? '5
It seems to us that answers to such questions can be obtained only with
considerably more data than we have now. Such information might reveal that
we are incorrect in our most basic assumptions concerning nonuniformity. It is
certainly not well-known, for instance, the extent to which U.C.C. texts are or
are not uniform, nor is the rate of nonuniform enactments a matter of any great
certainty. Are they on the increase as we suppose them to be? Are there any
identifiable patterns within and among states in the amending process that
might show some of the driving considerations behind them?
From data of the kind we have described, we might draw important conclusions. We might conclude, for example, that strict uniformity is a worthwhile
goal but that it competes unacceptably with others. It is theoretically possible, at
least, to determine and seek some optimal level of uniformity, one that would
promote an acceptable balance of predictability, concordance of business practices and the law, and flexibility for local adaptation and evolution over time. It
may be that the current federal experiment will produce the optimal balance
Congress." Clark, U.C.C. Survey: Secured TransactionsForward:Growing Federal Presence in the
Law of Secured Transactions,42 Bus. Law. 1333, 1335-36 (1987).
43. "The process of change ... ," Mr. Mooney states, "has received too little attention."
Mooney, supra note 4, at 1348.
44. Cf Mooney, supra note 4, at 1355-57.
45. See also supra note 34.
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naturally by pressures within the system itself. Or we might discover that
parochial self-indulgence is leading us in the direction of 52 Codes, and that an
optimal balance of all interests and goals involved simply cannot be had under a
uniform-state-law system.
We hope that in raising provocative questions and pursuing the research
avenues that those questions suggest, this Subcommittee can contribute to a
better understanding both of what we have in the U.C.C. and of what we need
to make it better.

